This dissertation seeks to explain the puzzling phenomenon of "technological leapfrogging." One of the most unexpected developments of the 1990s is that firms in a number of newly created states with agriculturally based economies and mixed histories of industrial success were able, in the time span of one generation, to move to the forefront of new Information Technologies (IT). Even more surprising, the IT industries of these countries encompass a wide range of organizational models and carve out different positions within the global IT industry production networks. These developments challenge two key assumptions underlying much of current development theory: i) that economies must necessarily travel through a defined path
from less to more technologically advanced industries, mastering each stage in sequence and ii) that in every period there is only one "best" path toward industrialization. I argue that employing varied science and technology industrial policies, emerging economies can successfully spur the creation of rapid innovation-based industries.
1 Furthermore, the research shows that the choices states made gave birth to distinctively different IT industries by shaping the skills, business models, and relationships of local industry with the global markets.
The dissertation aims to clarify not only what less-developed states can or cannot do to spur the creation of sustained IT industrial growth but also to demarcate the limits of state actions and the dynamics of state-industry interactions. To do so, the analysis focuses on the ways in which Ireland, Israel, and Taiwan influenced the capabilities developed and obtained by their domestic IT industries. The aim is to propose a theory concerning the influence of particular policies on the development of rapid innovation-based industries in emerging economies. Ultimately, the dissertation seeks to understand how different industrial systems are created. Initial state action is required in less-developed economies, as private firms are not willing or able to incur the risks that research and development (R&D) activities entail. I argue, first, that decisions by the state on how to acquire the necessary R&D skills influence which organizations, private or public, conduct industrial R&D. The location of R&D activities has substantial influence over the kind of capabilities developed by private firms. Secondly, decisions by the state over the level of control concerning the technological development path of the industry, including decisions of how and whom to finance, as well as whether, and how, to induce investors to finance the IT industry, have a significant bearing on both the R&D resources available to the industry, and the scope of R&D activities taken. Thirdly, state efforts toward developing local leading companies have long-term consequences for the industry's opportunity structure. Fourthly, state decisions regarding foreign firms and investors within and outside its national borders affect the resources and information the industry receives from its main customers, as well as the 1. Rapid innovation-based industries are defined as industries populated by New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs), where NTBFs are defined as companies whose products are new technologies, are based on their own and others' R&D effort to commercialize applications of new technology, or companies whose main revenue stream is based on R&D efforts to develop new technologies. For more on rapid innovation-based industrialization, see Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State: Political Choice and Strategies for Growth in Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland (New Haven, Conn., 2007) . diffusion and development of specific innovative capabilities. Of particular importance are decisions taken on whether to enhance specific relationships between local and foreign companies, investors, and financial markets.
With regard to the political process of development, the dissertation contends that in successful cases of rapid innovation-based industrial development, the state agencies first create a set of firms and industrial actors (organizations that are involved in the industry but are not private firms) and then seek to develop a deeply meshed network among firms and between firms and the state. The state also helps to embed firms into international financial and production markets and networks. My findings are that in successful cases of rapid innovation-based industrial development, the state's initial role is as a key actor in the creation of a network. The state at first creates a hierarchical network and then in the course of a co-evolution process (that is, a process in which two or more parties influence the development of each other) the network becomes denser as well as more egalitarian and international, with the state moving from a position of power and control into a position of centrality. Consequently, the state becomes more of a facilitator organizer and less of an overall commander.
When successful, the different ways the state shapes the development of the networks of the local IT industry profoundly influences its structure and capabilities. In contrast to the neo-developmental state theorists, I claim that the same state, using the same policy tools, can manage both success and failure in different sub-sectors of the IT industry, depending on the particular dynamics of the co-evolution process of state-industry relations. I distinguish between two kinds of failures. The first is the inability or unwillingness of the state to facilitate and participate in the growth of this industrial network structure. The second type of failure occurs when the state actively participates in the creation of the industry and its networks, but then tries to retain its position of power and control, aiming to maintain hierarchical relationships. This framework is used to analyze and 2. For more on the arguments of the networked polity, see Christopher K. Ansell, "The Networked Polity: Regional Development in Western Europe," The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925 -1975 (Stanford Calif., 1982 ; Atul Kohli, "Where Do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 'Developmental State, '" World Development 22, no. 9 (1994) Series, vol. 5 (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1994) .
5. For examples of work in this tradition and its theoretical background, see Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism As no single strand of literature provided the necessary theory to answer the questions I addressed, I brought together arguments of several theories. The developmental state and late development theories provided an understanding of the role of the state in economic growth in emerging economies. Globalization theories, specifically those focusing on global production networks and industrial fragmentation, offered a way to understand development in the radical new conditions caused by the rise of global production networks. 
Israel
In less than twenty years, Israel has emerged as a key player in global IT technology, with Israeli companies pioneering many hardware and software market niches, such as voice-over-IP, encrypting, printed circuit board inspection, antiviral protection, digital printing, and firewalls. This small country of only six million has, after the United States and Canada, the highest number of IT companies listed on NAS-DAQ. In 2000, Israeli IT industrial exports reached over $13 billion and accounted for more than 71 percent of all industrial exports, and the IT industry alone accounted for 70 percent of GDP growth. 8 Starting in the late 1960s, the Israeli state set out to develop an indigenous science-based industry with sophisticated, new product-oriented, export-focused industrial R&D capabilities. Without targeting specific sectors or technologies, the state supplied financial backing to R&D projects developed and executed by private firms and entrepreneurs. Israel's bureaucracy has never strictly followed the Weberian model of a routinized, orderly, and hierarchical bureaucracy. Throughout the years, there have been attempts both to professionalize the civil service and to follow the American model of a "government of strangers," allowing politicians to have more control over their ministries by bringing with them many of their own people. The result has been a mixed-structure civil service with a relatively low status and workforce continuity. 9 The Office of the Chief Scientists in the Ministry of Trade and Industry (OCS), Israel's science and technology industrial development agency, is a perfect example of such structure: its heads are recruited outside the agency, with a particularly large number of executives and employees brought on either as consultants or recruited directly from other organizations outside the bureaucracy. On the local-global front, the Israeli state encouraged Israeli and foreign companies, especially American ones, to form partnerships in which the Israeli firms focused on R&D and the foreign firms on marketing and sales. Unique in the less-developed world, Israel focused first and foremost on trying to convince Multinational Corporations (MNCs) to open R&D centers rather than manufacturing facilities within its borders. The state also linked both its companies and its venture capital industry to foreign financial markets. We can now understand why in Israel both the hardware industry and the software industry became equally successful with almost all firms utilizing a similar strategy-R&D leading to either the development of new technologies or new products based on cutting edge technology. Israeli companies positioned themselves as suppliers of new R&D inputs to the IT industry's global production networks. Israel has become perhaps the most prominent location in which foreign companies and MNCs have opened large-scale R&D centers.
Ireland
Ireland concentrated for many years on job creation. The state followed a much less-active strategy in regards to the indigenous IT industry. While vastly improving its educational, physical, and communication infrastructure, Ireland's industrial policy focused on encouraging foreign companies to open manufacturing facilities within its borders. The Irish development agencies followed the ideal-type, if English in style, Weberian structure, with internal recruiting, training, and career development procedures. However, as in England, there was a strong distinction between the social-sciences-humanity-law "general-educated" employees groomed for management and the technical engineering "expert-educated" personnel whose careers do not lead to high management positions.
10 Accordingly, Ireland opted to follow the third strategy of acquiring technology and industryspecific skills-creating domain-specific subunits staffed with industry insiders-when these skills were deemed necessary. There were very limited resources devoted to R&D in Ireland. Even when the Ireland Development Authority (IDA) established a program to promote local industry in the late 1980s, its focus was on job creation and not on R&D. This especially hurt the hardware sector, which needs more financing than software to conduct R&D successfully or commence operations. In addition, during the 1980s the hardware industry had to compete fiercely for the limited amount of skilled engineers against MNCs who were recruiting for both their Irish and global facilities. With meager financial resources and unable to offer secure long-term employment, the Irish hardware industry was at a severe disadvantage. This failure of the state to engage with the specific needs of the Irish hardware industry is a case of stage I failure.
Only in the late 1990s did Ireland start to pay close attention to the assistance its local companies might need abroad, and even then the state limited its role to that of a promoter of companies in various foreign markets and did not attempt to structure specific relationships between local and foreign firms. In regard to foreign financial markets, the state, while happy that some IT firms publicly listed on foreign stock exchange, has also encouraged them to list locally. In addition, while employing and channeling EU grants, the state focused on local financial institutions as the main loci for its various initiatives to create a local venture capital industry.
This analysis helps us to understand why the Irish IT industry developed in the way it did. Even with the IDA's long history of bringing foreign hardware firms to open large manufacturing facilities in Ireland, it is the indigenous software industry that has become the more successful sector. The hardware sector has struggled. The Irish IT industry focuses on developing products of mid-level sophistication, most of which are innovative mainly in applying existing IT technologies to new domains. The more successful companies prefer to double-list on both the local stock exchange and foreign ones. The level of acquisition of Irish firms by MNCs, while still higher than Taiwan's, is a lot lower than in Israel, both in total numbers and in the average size of the financial transaction. The IT industry is still dominated by foreign firms concentrating on activities of relatively low sophistication, and the overall level of innovation in Ireland is the lowest of my three cases.
Taiwan
The spectacular and unique growth trajectory of the Taiwanese IT hardware industry, and the less than spectacular growth of its software industry, stems from a distinctive institutional system of industrial innovation. This system was built around R&D science and technology industrial policy led by public research institutions, with a specific goal of attaining a defined position within the IT industry's global production network. Taiwan has an enormously successful hardware industry in which the early leading firms have been focusing on supplying components and OEM manufacturing services to foreign companies.
11 This gave rise to an industrial system that focuses on second generation, process, and manufacturing innovation, with a division of labor between the state and private firms. The state conducts most of the early technology screening and R&D, and the private companies focus more on final product development. It is an industrial system in which most of the firms are supplying components and design and manufacturing services to the IT industry's global production networks. The Taiwanese state attempted to direct and control the technological development path of the IT industry. In Taiwan, the bureaucracy recruitment is modeled on the Japanese tradition in which exams divide candidates into different management and career patterns.
12 Almost all the top bureaucrats of the development agencies and ministries have a Ph.D. in various engineering disciplines. The 11. OEM is a sub-contracting manufacturing relationship in which one side manufactures equipment for the other side to be sold under the second sides brand name and in accordance with the second sides detailed specifications. Original Design Manufacturing (ODM) is a subcontracting relationship in which the manufacturing side is also giving detailed and integrated design services to the brand name company, which supplies it with only high level design specifications. Own Brand Manufacturing (OBM) happens when the manufacturer is manufacturing products to be sold under its own brand.
12. For more on the Japanese bureaucracy, see Hyung-Ki Kim et al., eds., The Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development: Catalysts of Change (New York, 1995) . state, already relatively well equipped with scientific experts in its decision-making apparatus, opted to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge for IT industrial development by encompassing the industrial technology creating agents within its bureaucratic structure. It established two public research institutes, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) and the Institute for Information Industry (III). The Taiwanese state also supplied funds for industrial R&D and encouraged, albeit within its structure, R&D activities on a wide spectrum of technologies.
However, while ITRI saw as its ultimate goal the creation of a thriving private hardware industry and has successfully managed its own diminishing role as the industry grew, the situation in software has been radically different. From its inception, III tried to maximize its financial resources and control. In contrast to ITRI, III has been reluctant to see its power diminish and has continuously competed with the industry. Thus, the case of the Taiwanese software industry is a case of second stage failure-inability of the state to relinquish its own power over the sectoral industrial system and move from a hierarchical to a networked mode of governance.
On the local-global relationship front, Taiwan has aimed to help the local industry excel in supplying components as well as manufacturing and design services to the IT industry's global production networks. The state encouraged foreign companies to establish manufacturing facilities in Taiwan. But unlike Ireland, Taiwan then pushed these companies to procure an increasing number of components locally and to transfer the necessary skills and know-how for their production to local suppliers. In addition, Taiwan encouraged local companies to be publicly listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange rather than on foreign stock exchanges. The state has targeted the local financial community as the source for the IT industry's venture capital.
Conclusion
The last chapter of the dissertation focuses on comparing, and generalizing from, the three cases. Using both qualitative and quantitive analysis, it contrasts the full spectrum of innovational activities in Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan. It then discusses how the growth of the three industries was shaped by ideologies, conceptualizations of the national economic problems, and available resources. Hence, the growth of the IT industry presents another mirror to the political struggle of the three nations and their constant dynamics of defining what it is to be Irish, Israeli, and Taiwanese.
The second part of the chapter analyzes the different strengths and weaknesses of each model, with the dual aim of providing policy recommendations and evaluating the generalizability of the lessons from Israel, Ireland, and Taiwan. One of the main arguments of the proposed theoretical framework, in opposition to other theoretical traditions, is viewing success in rapid innovation-based industrialization as a fragile achievement. Thus, a critical issue for all three nations is the constant contemplation of their weaknesses and future. The dissertation is concluded by contending that a key lesson learned is that there are many ways to reach the goal of rapid innovation-based industrial growth. Each one necessitates different skills, resources, and factors. Hence, other emerging economies need to analyze their own strengths and weaknesses before charting their own course of rapid innovation-based industrial growth.
